The notion that individuals face idiosyncratic labor-market uncertainty is a common one. Government programs such as unemployment insurance and social security are motivated by such an idea. Economic theory, ranging from labor supply to savings behavior to asset pricing, often presupposes that such risks are important. (1994) show that inequality in labor earnings, total income, and consumption increases with age. They suggest that this is difficult to reconcile with standard models of complete consumption insurance. In Storesletten et al. (2000) we ask similar questions using a general-equilibrium life-cycle model. We conclude that increasing inequality with age, consumption inequality in particular, is difficult to explain in the absence of uninsured idiosyncratic shocks received throughout the working years. We argue that between 40 percent and 50 percent of an individual' s lifetime uncertainty remains unresolved prior to entering the workforce. This paper further examines the implications of increasing inequality with age. We begin by asking if a very different model, one which features full risk-sharing, can account for the data. The idea, which Deaton and Paxson (1994) attribute to Steven Davis, is that increasing income and consumption inequality can arise in a perfect insurance setting if (i) dispersion in labor productivity increases with age, and (ii) preferences are nonseparable between leisure and consumption. If this is true, an efficient allocation may feature increasing consumption dispersion, because higher-productivity workers will supply relatively more labor and be compensated with more consumption. We develop a specific model and find that, for plausible parameter values, this is exactly what happens. What also happens, however, is that such an allocation features increasing inequality in hours worked. Using data from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID), we show that inequality in hours worked is roughly constant across age. This casts doubt on the full risksharing model and strengthens the argument in favor of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk.
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The remainder of our paper provides a more general discussion of the evidence on inequality and age, and how this suggests an important role for idiosyncratic labor-market shocks. . Figure 1 indicates that, throughout the working years, the cross-sectional variances of consumption and income increase by factors of 2 and 3, respectively. In contrast inequality in hours worked is roughly constant until retirement. The income profile will serve to calibrate our process for labor productivity. The contrast between the consumption and hours-worked profiles will provide restrictions on our theory.
II. A Complete-Markets Model
Consider an economy populated by H overlapping generations of agents, each generation consisting of a large number of atomistic agents. Lifetimes are uncelrtain, with (p,, denoting the unconditional probability of surviving to age h ? H. Preferences are defined over lifetime consumption, c, and leisure, e:
where ,B, y and 1/(1 -v) denote, respectively, the utility discount factor, the risk-aversion coefficient, and the (intratemporal) elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure. The ith agent of age h has labor productivity e11', where uih is a stochastic process which is independent across agents. Each agent supplies 1 -tih units of labor to a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function and receives labor earnings of w(1 -e ih)eti", where w is the marginal product of aggregate labor. We abstract from aggregate shocks, implying that w is a constant. Increasing inequality in labor productivity is generated by persistence in uih: 
IV. The Importance of Idiosyncratic Risk
The previous section casts doubt on a complete-markets interpretation of increasing consumption inequality. Our story is robust to alternative models of increasing income inequality, such as deterministic heterogeneity in wage growth. The following evidence, however, supports our specification of persistent idiosyncratic shocks. Figure  1 does not appear to be a simple manifestation of higher wage growth for more educated workers. (iii) Should increasing income inequality be attributable to heterogeneity which is deterministic across households, many models of consumption choice predict that consumption inequality will not increase with age. The simple reason is the intertemporal smoothing motive. A young worker who anticipates relatively high wage growth will borrow against it, causing future inequality in wages to be reflected in current inequality in consumption. In Storesletten et al. (2000) we develop a particular example. We show that, unless roughly half of the dispersion in income is attributable to shocks received over the working years, our model generates an insufficient increase in consumption inequality. The important caveats are financial frictions such as borrowing constraints which, obviously,
